I have always been worried about British military intervention in Afghanistan. Over the last year I have been calling on the government to rethink its strategy. We have been at war for eight years. Many fine and brave soldiers are being killed. There has been a sense of drift over the direction and political strategy from the top.

It was never likely that the allies would commit sufficient troops to fight and win control of the whole of Afghanistan. It is a vast country, and every village and hamlet may offer resistance, given the mobility and penetration of the Taliban. The aim should not be to conquer and then garrison this country with foreign armies. The Russians showed how difficult the task was when they tried.

It appears from the recent statements of President Karzai and Prime Minister Brown that any idea of military victory by foreign armies has now been shelved. The new strategy which is emerging is a welcome improvement on the old “win and control”. There is now a proposed timetable of five years to transfer all security tasks from allied troops to local personnel in Afghanistan.

So far so good. The questions to raise now are these. Why does it need five years to train the Afghan army and police to the point where they can do the job? Will our troops in the meantime be taken off fighting duties and put onto training duties, with local forces leading the attack on the insurgents? If not, how long will it be before they can?

Why do we now think this present government, elected in such a contentious way, can command the support of the people of Afghanistan and why is it worthy or our support backed by the lives of our troops? Will President Karzai’s own new strategy include a successful political plan to win over the many disparate groups in Afghanistan who currently harbour, encourage or put up with the insurgents? All those who know Afghanistan better than I do tell me it is tribal and local in nature. Local forces and loyalties need to be respected and harnessed against the insurgents. This is more difficult to do if the central government appears corrupt, divisive or oppressive to the rest of the country.