I have posted the full transcript of the one hour debate we were allowed on Thursday on Northern Rock, because it illustrates just how damaged Parliament has been by the constant use of timetable motions that are unrealistic.

The Lords passed three amendments to Labour’s bank nationalisation Bill. One wanted the Freedom of Information Act to apply to Northern Rock, just as it applies to the rest of the public sector. One wanted a proper audit report on what we are buying, and a third wanted more detail on the competition arrangements. All three were perfectly reasonable requests. They did not seek to prevent the nationalisation of Northern Rock or some other bank. They were well within the spirit of the decision of the Commons to press ahead with nationalisation, taken a couple of days before.

It was clear these amendments would need a few hours of debate. Each one raised very different issues, worthy of a separate debate. Because the government decided to drive it all through in one hour, they ”grouped” all these amendments together, along with some government amendments. The Opposition offered to sit through the night, as urgency was part of the government’s agenda, even though we could not see the need for the urgency. Alternatively the House could have met on Friday again to discuss Northern Rock, and Friday’s business could have been transferred to a day next week. The government refused to co-operate.

As a result we had one hour. The Chief Secretary to the Treasury occupied half of this with her comments. She took a number of interventions. We needed to intervene for two reasons – firstly because she was not explaining her position clearly and convincingly, and secondly because we knew there would not be time for us to make speeches so several of us chose to make one of our points in this less satisfactory way. The Shadow Spokesman kept his remarks much shorter. This allowed Sir Stuart Bell to speak, and the Lib Dem Spokesman got a few minutes at the end. No Conservative backbencher could make a full speech, No Lib Dem backbencher, and only one Labour backbencher. The front benches had no time to return to the debate to deal with points raised by other MPs.

The Conservative government used timetable motions sparingly. We did so if the Opposition had spent many hours on the first clause or amendment to a Bill, and showed every sign of wishing to delay and prevaricate as much as possible. Most Bills went through with time unlimited, so the Opposition could choose what they wished to talk about, how many of them wished to speak, and for how long. It was a much more democratic way, and ensured that all important amendments and clauses were debated. The government benefited from this, because there are times when Parliament – and those who brief us – made important points that led to a modification or improvement of a measure.

Thursday’s performance reminded me just how much Parliament has lost by ruthless timetabling. There were good issues to discuss. Some of us had things to say. The government had not made its case satisfactorily on why we were to be denied access to information on Northern Rock, and why we were buying it without a proper audit report on what we were buying. The lack of time to discuss it was unreasonable.

There will be a cost to the taxpayer. Rushing into this purchase without proper consideration is likely to mean bigger losses and problems for taxpayers ahead. The Lords unfortunately did not sustain their pressure on the 3 points. The Lib Dems decided they agreed sufficiently with the Bill that they did not want to prolong the dispute even for a few more hours. Once they gave in there was no point the Conservative peers continuing, as they did not have the votes.

Sensible Ministers welcome Parliamentary debate, and listen to commonsense points made by others. Ministers who rush legislation through often live to regret it. The nationalisation of Northern Rock is not the answer, but the beginning of a whole series of new and difficult questions for the government. As Parliament was not able to ask them all and have them cleared up satisfactorily, they will now be determined by events. Events can be much rougher for Ministers to handle.

One day we will find out if Northern Rock is now going to be run down, or if there is a way for a nationalised bank to compete fairly and grow its business. One day we will find out if people are going to be sacked and if so how many. One day we will find out what the true profits and losses have been in recent months. One day we will discover how much cash taxpayers have had to put in, and one day we will find out the full extent of the financial arrangements put in place for the public servants at the top of this company. As so much of this is forbidden fruit at the moment for Parliament, the media will find it so much more tempting to pick it.

In Northern Rock’s 2006 Accounts they reported how well they were doing. They commented “ The low risk nature of Northern Rock’s balance sheet is reflected in the mix of assets…These assets are well funded through a well diversified range of assets.” They looked forward to further low risk growth, and told their shareholders that the new regulations under Basle II would mean they could reduce the amount of money they needed in their business to support the then level of activity. What a difference a year makes.

Last year they put aside £126 million for possible losses on their lending, most of it for the unsecured loans they had offered people on top of their mortgages. This represented just 0.15% of the amounts they had lent. This year I am sure the new management will want to look at this and step it up considerably. They may also wish to record losses on many other features of the Northern Rock business, as prudence would dictate lower values for some of the assets on the balance sheet, and putting money aside for redundancies and future re-financing costs. There is likely to be a lot of red ink spilled as Auditors and new management try to agree what is fair. The taxpayer will take the hit.

The media and political classes have suddenly alighted on the issue of Granite, the offshore financing company that has issued substantial amounts of paper to its investors, and which holds a lot of Northern Rock’s mortgages. In order to understand what is going on , we need to look at how a mortgage bank can raise money to finance its business.

Northern Rock prided itself on using four principal methods to raise money to lend to people, claiming this showed it was prudent and not too dependent on any one method.

The first is to collect money from savers, through so called retail deposits. If you or I put our few hundred pounds into a bank or building society we are letting them use our money to lend to people on mortgage. Some MPs now seem to think this is the right way to finance a mortgage business, and think it is the prudent way. 22% of Northern’s business was paid for by these deposits at end 2006. Paradoxically, it was this method of finance which led Northern Rock to borrow so much money from the taxpayer, because once the small savers lost confidence in the Bank they wanted their money back, leaving Northern short of funds. It is the ultimate example of borrowing short to lend long – many of the small savers place their money with banks like Northern in deposits where they can get their money out in a day, or with a month’s notice. Mortgage banks lend this money on for much longer time periods, usually safe in the knowledge that their depositors will not all want their money back on the same day, and confident that others will come along to deposit.

The second is to borrow from the money markets – so-called wholesale funds. 24% of Northern’s money came from this source at end 2006. Much of this borrowing is also short term, but banks can usually rely on being able to borrow it over and over again, so again it is usually safe to lend it out for much longer periods. This source of funding dried up in the Credit Crunch of September 2006.

The third is securitisation. 43% of Northern’s money came from this source by end 2006. The bank packaged up groups of mortgages, and sold them to a Granite offshore company. The buyers hold a piece of paper in a Granite company, and receive interest payments based on the mortgages within their company. This financing can be arranged for longer time periods, like the mortgages themselves.

The fourth comes from issuing bonds, where the bondholder lends money to the company for a fixed period. These too can be for longer periods than 1 and 2 above. Northern raised £6.2 billion in bonds, offering mortgages as security for those as well so the bondholders would get their money back if anything happened to Northern Rock itself.

Northern’s critics now tell us this was a risky business model, because it entailed borrowing short and lending long. All banking involves an element of that – that is how banks make their money because they can charge more for the longer term loans they make than they have to pay for the short term money they borrow. They can also, of course, charge more for the loans they make to reflect the greater risks of those loans. Northern’s collapse resulted from the sudden drying up of the money markets, followed by the swift withdrawal of too many retail deposits. Two of its four funding methods went wrong.

The sudden fascination with Granite is probably overdone. Northern took the prudent line on reporting Granite. It kept all the loans and all the borrowings on its own balance sheet. It did so because it manages the mortgages in Granite, and because it has to replace any mortgages that fail to meet the standards required, and because it has to top up the Granite companies with new mortgages if the mortgages are repaid too quickly. Northern also has securitisation arrangements through Dolerite Funding and Whinstone, on a more modest scale than Granite. These are also clearly shown in the last Accounts on the balance sheet.

The argument over Granite revolves around the government saying they are not nationalising the Granite companies and the Opposition pointing out that Granite is part of Northern Rock’s balance sheet with obligations from Northern Rock to Granite that will continue. In addition Northern has an £8.4 billion investment in Granite.

The bigger argument will become how much value can taxpayers put on all of this? The 2007 Accounts are likely to look very different from the 2006. I expect to see some hefty write downs in Northern Rock’s asset base. Valuing their share in Granite is just one part of a much more complex and difficult picture. The valuers also have to take into account the interests of all those who have made money available through securitisation to the Northern Rock business.

Yesterday saw another successful government attempt to stifle debate and prevent serious consideration of an important billon bank nationalisation. I was left with just six minutes to try to discuss all the wide ranging issues involved during the Second Reading debate on the principles, whilst the perfunctory two and a quarter hour committee stage left completely inadequate time for all the amendments we needed to consider.

It was a pity. It was a pity for the North East, and for all who wish to see Northern Rock given a chance of a decent future. It was a tragedy for taxpayers, who will now be required to buy a mortgage bank by a government that seems to have no concern for what it is buying, and no idea of how much it will cost taxpayers over the next couple of years.

I would have liked to have spent more time discussing the importance of Northern Rock to the North East, and how the North Eastern economy could be encouraged to branch out more into the usually profitable and successful world of financial and business services. It is good news that Northern Rock took root there. It is bad news that it should be Northern Rock that got into so much financial trouble, and bad news that there are few other large financial institutions anchored in the North East.

We had no chance to look at the way the Bank and government last summer failed to keep markets liquid enough. The Fed in the USA and the ECB in Euroland did a much better job supplying cash to their markets, so no European or US bank got into the problems Northern Rock faced.

We had no chance to discuss the impact of Gordon Brown’s decision to take banking supervision and government debt management away from the Bank of England. In the Conservative Economic Policy Review we warned that once times got more difficult in money markets the UK was uniquely vulnerable to a banking crisis because these reforms left the Bank of England unable to respond quickly in the way it could have done prior to the Brown changes.

Last August we stated in Freeing Britain to compete:

“We are concerned about the division of responsibility between the FSA and the Bank over banking and market regulation. Fortunately, conditions in the last decade have been benign internationally, with no serious threats to banking liquidity. We think it would be safer if the Bank of England had responsibility for solvency regulation of UK based banks, as well as having an overall duty to keep the system solvent. Otherwise there could be dangerous delays if a banking crisis did hit, with information having to be exchanged between the two regulators; and there might be gaps in each regulator’s view of the banking sector at a crucial time, where early regulatory action might have spared a worse problem”

If the danger was obvious from Opposition, why couldn’t the government see it? Why was the Chancellor lecturing the banking sector on how they had misbehaved, and telling them there would be no bail outs, on the eve of this crisis which triggered the biggest bail out ever mounted in the UK? Indeed, there were rumours about which bank was likely to get into difficulties first in the credit crunch; before the run on the Rock began. We did not repeat the rumours because we did not wish to make life more difficult for that institution.

At this late stage, I still urge the government to consider the serious alternative to nationalisation – the Bank of England acting as Northern’s bank manager, until Northern Rock can repay the state loans and refinance itself elsewhere. It removes all the hassle of a government having to take a public view on repossessions, new mortgage offers, staff numbers and pensions. It gives Northern Rock a better chance of a decent future, as it puts some real financial discipline into senior management that is usually lacking in a nationalised industry in the UK. It protects the taxpayer better, and gives more chance of saving and creating new jobs in the North East.

Nationalisation has proved a long and lingering run down for all too many businesses to fall under its spell. Last night there were no reassurances from Ministers about the future of Northern Rock jobs, and no statement of whether they will be running the Bank down or trying to build it up. I suspect they do not know, because so much rests on what the European Competition Commissioner will let a public sector Northern Rock do. It is a pity the government did not settle that first so they could tell Parliament and public, before committing us to such an expensive and a hazardous project as nationalisation.

I am a businessman by background. I have occasionally bought or sold companies. Never have I been asked to buy a company with so little information available on its assets, liabilities, past and possible future performance as today, when the government wants me to approve the purchase of Northern Rock for taxpayers. Never have I been asked to put my name to such a huge commitment before – placing the taxpayer at risk for more than £110 billion.

They will not tell me how much they wish to pay for the shares. That will be decided after they have announced the purchase and legislated for it! This is not the usual negotiating procedure between buyer and seller.

Because they are compelling sale by the shareholders, they leave taxpayers open to lawsuits. I doubt they will tell us how much of a risk that is, nor will we be given their legal advice to make our own decision about how likely a successful legal challenge for compensation might be.

We will not be told what is the true state of the mortgages that are the banks’ main assets, and we will not be given a schedule of either assets or liabilities. There will be no accountant’s reports, no assessment of the term structure of the loans and assets, and no commentary on the likely movement in the bad debts.

We will not see management accounts for the last year, and we will not have budgets for the next couple of years. We will not even be told what the general outlines of the business plan might be, because they are awaiting clearance from Brussels for how much new trading they can undertake. They will have to be careful about what the bank can offer in the marketplace, as its privileged access to public money leaves it open to allegations of anti competitive trading if it gets the offer wrong.

We will not be given a report on the size of the deficit in the pension scheme and how that has been calculated, nor will we be warned that the pension deficit might be about to get larger in the light of recent regulatory and actuarial comments on how people are all living much longer than has been allowed for in many a pension fund calculation.

There will be no environmental report on the properties with an assessment of risk under Environmental regulation, which any purchaser would need these days. There will be no property report about the leases and freeholds, and the lease and maintenance obligations.

We will not see the main contracts of the very expensive senior staff to be able to review the bonus arrangements and to see how much it will cost taxpayers if we need to terminate some of their employments. We will not receive a Human Resources report on pay, morale and efficiency of the workforce we will inherit.

There will be no survey of customer attitudes or study of the value of the brand post the disturbing changes to it in recent weeks. There will be no report on the relationship with the Trust, on the ability of a public enterprise to sponsor one particular football team or on the extent to which a nationalised company can continue the social and community work Northern Rock performed in its profitable private sector days.

In sum, Parliament will have none of the usual information directors would require as matter of course from acquiring management and their advisers before consenting to an acquisition. Perhaps for that reason Parliament is once again being railroaded and sidelined by the government. It is a farce to allow only one busy Parliamentary day to consider all stages of the Commons procedure for this bill. It means we have had no normal time to read the Bill and table amendments, and if we had there will be insufficient time to debate them. This is rushed debate on a botched nationalisation by a government which has not done its homework. The taxpayer is being put into a deal without knowing the price or the long term risk and cost. Ministers tell us all that taxpayers are risking is guarantee. Not so Ministers – the taxpayer is now liable for every broken window in a branch, every severance and pension payment, every mortgage and loan. If the assets cannot cover the cost of these things taxpayers will have to pay more tax to sort it out.

The Northern Rock crisis has undermined this government’s economic reputation, and deservedly so. They have made mistake after mistake in responding the Credit Crunch and the run on the bank. I have put the main blog entries on Northern Rock from this site together so people can remind themselves of the way the crisis unfolded from last summer. The main errors (highlighted at the time on this site) were:

July 2007 It was clear that credit was too tight and interest rates were too high for comfort. “If the central banks don’t back off soon it could be quite a collapse”. The UK authorities failed to supply enough liquidity to markets or to lower rates.

August 2007 The Credit squeeze became clearer in the markets, and some more City commentators came to appreciate the dangers. The UK authorities still did nothing.

September 1-13 The Fed and the ECB were taking action to relieve the squeeze, but the UK authorities still did nothing.

September 13th The Chancellor makes a stupid speech blaming the banks for poor lending and stating firmly there will be no bail outs of banks in trouble. This was an open invitation to anyone banking with a weaker institution to remove their money whilst they still could.

September 14th onwards Government and Bank of England become lender of last resort to Northern Rock and allow this to become public knowledge, encouraging a run on the bank.

Government fails to arrange a take-over for Northern Rock before the run develops, claiming the legal framework it has put in place does not allow it to.

Government allows the run on Northern Rock to develop, and only when it is very serious does it announce the biggest guarantee and bail out ever attempted in the UK.

Government lends around £25 billion to Northern Rock without being able to assure us it has taken sufficient high quality collateral to ensure taxpayers can get all their money back.
Government fails to set out terms for the loan, including the all important question of when it expects repayment. Government fails to tell us that it has carried out usual banking due diligence and leaves doubt about what power it has exerted to ensure proper monitoring of the loan, strong covenants, and a professional approach to repayment.

Government becomes involved in shareholder discussions and decisions about finding a new management team/new shareholders for the bank and raising new equity for it. These discussions fail to produce an answer acceptable to all concerned, but drag on from September 2007 until February 2008.

Government nationalises the bank, more than doubling the taxpayers’ risk at a stroke and leaving itself open to endless legal disputes and rows about compensation and the way it will run the bank under its ownership.

What should the government have done differently? As this blog shows it should have

1. Made more liquidity available to markets and cut interest rates last summer, to prevent banks like Northern Rock being denied all access to market finance so it did not develop into the crisis we saw.
2. Not lecture the banks on their imperfections when the system was so distressed, as the Chancellor must have known when he spoke
3. Avoid any lender of last resort lending being made public, or cover the lending to one bank by requiring all banks to borrow something so the markets were not spooked about one individual bank – this could have been part of a general liquidity increase and sold sensibly to markets
4. When lending to Northern Rock understand the need to be a strong and firm lender. This meant limiting the sums, and limiting the time of the loan. It meant telling the Board of the bank that they only had so long to find alternative private sector money, and if they could not they had to start selling mortgages and running off their business book to meet the repayments required.
5. Staying out of discussion about new shareholders and new management to increase the chances of something happening, but keeping up the pressure on them to reach a quick solution by demanding early repayment tranches.

At every stage the government made the wrong call. They have now ended up with the worst possible of worlds, and will doubtless run this bank as badly as they have been running Network Rail and the Post Office. In the first case they doubled the costs of running the track quite quickly after nationalising it, and in the second case they have embarked on a large programme of closures having undermined its counters business by their own decisions.

<strong>Click <a href="http://www.johnredwoodsdiary.com/category/northern-rock/">here </a>to see the archive of John Redwood’s previous postings on Northern Rock.</strong>

Mr Darling is already in a big hole, thanks to his misjudgements over monetary policy last August and September, the run on Northern Rock, the botched proposals on capital gains tax and the U turn on Non Doms. Now, the man in the hole has decided to more than double its size!

There are ten reasons why nationalising Northern Rock is a bad idea.

1. It more than doubles the amount of money the taxpayer has at risk,from a little over £50 billion to more than £100 billion
2. It means any bad loan Northern Rock owns, the taxpayer will own.
3. It means the taxpayer is now liable for any redundancy payments if Northern Rock has to slim its staff numbers.
4. The taxpayer may have to defend against writs from angry shareholders if the compensation terms are not sufficient.
5. The taxpayer becomes responsible for the pensions deficit for staff
6. The taxpayer has to pay compensation to shareholders at a time when public borrowing is already excessive
7. The Chancellor will have to explain mortgage foreclosures, staff redundancies and other bad news to Parliament each time it happens
8. The amount of total government borrowing will increase as a result of the big increase in the amount of money at risk, and the cash needs of the business.
9. The taxpayer will have to pay any losses, meet any write downs of assets and pay for all capital expenditure of the business.
10. The government and taxpayer may be accused of undercutting other viable financial businesses competing against this bank dependent on public money if they are not careful with their guarantees, subsidies and pricing.

What due diligence will the Chancellor do if any before committing the taxpayer to all these liabilities? What law suits if any is he anticipating from shareholders? What will be the cost of compensation to shareholders? What will his policy be on remuneration for his new state employees and how will that fit in with other public sector remuneration?

Tomorrow we need a statement from the Chancellor. There will be all too many questions, but I fear this botched nationalisation will not come with many convincing answers.

The Bank of England yesterday bowed to the inevitable and warned us that we will become worse off this year. Many people already feel worse off, after the huge increases in food and energy costs that we have experienced in recent months. There was no apology for leaving credit too loose a couple of years ago, and no public recognition that the Bank had kept conditions too tight last summer and autumn as the bakdrop to the Northern Rock crisis. There was no revision to the absurd line just before the Northern Rock crisis struck that banks had been foolish in their lending and there would be no bail outs!

The Bank is right that they are boxed in – boxed in by government spending that is too high, by a public sector whose productivity is too low, by past credit excess and rising prices, and by the more recent Credit crunch which is having a big impact on property. The Bank is partly boxed in by governemnt mistakes – the government should have reined back more on wasteful spending earlier, and cut public borrowing – and partly by its own erratic performance on money growth.

We now have a boom and bust approach to credit creation – boom in 2003-6, bust in 2007. We have had boom and boom in public spending. Now we see the government fighting to get to grips with the problem of over spending.

I am glad the Conservative leadership has responded to those of us who have asked that we should not match all of Labour’s spending plans in the future. We should keep all the teachers, nurses, doctors, police and armed services personnel, for they only cost under one quarter of publilc spending. We should not keep all the quangos, regional governments, ID cards, computerisation schemes, advertising budgets and management consultancy contracts. They do not represent value for money and they are squeezing the public needlessly.

I welcome the government’s decision to place the Northern Rock debt on the government’s own balance sheet. It always belonged there, as the Bank of England is wholly owned by the Treasury on behalf of taxpayers.
It is there as a reminder of the importance of getting this money back as quickly as possible. It does not help the government’s fianancial standing, given the high level of new borrowing being undertaken.

Today I learn that the Chancellor has become a mortgage salesman again. He is lecturing us to take long term mortgages at fixed rates. Has no-one reminded him that his government has made mortgage selling a regulated activity? I doubt if the Chancellor has bothered to fix himself up with the necessary regulatory approvals to start selling the fixed rate proposition so actively.

Is he aware that mortgage salesmen need to know their client? Does he grasp at all that long term fixed rate mortgages may work out dearer for some people? They do not make much sense if you plan to move on and repay the mortgage in a relatively short time period. The relative cost of floating rate and fixed rate mortgages can vary sharply as interest rates change. In a period of falling interest rates – which many think we are now in – locking yourself into a fixed rate mortgage may not be a good idea.

I hasten to add I am not a regulated mortgage salesman either, so anyone needing a new or different mortgage should go to a professional to seek advice geared to their own circumstances. This site general views and comments, but avoids individual advice on savings, borrowings and investments as these do require professional (and regulated) advice based on knowledge of the individual’s circumstances.

I find it extraordinary that our Chancellor is making this further foray into the world of lending and borrowing, after his last disastrous one just before the run on Northern Rock. Regular readers of this site will recall that I was very critical of his famous speech about how lending institutions had behaved irresponsibly, and would not in the UK be bailed out. His resolution to avoid helping the banks lasted but a few hectic days, before he bowed to the need to guarantee all deposits in all banks under pressure in UK jurisdiction!

He should also remember that as the taxpayer’s representative and principal bank manager to Northern Rock he is no longer above the fray on mortgage bank products. I just hope he has remembered to ask the management of Northern Rock to make sure they have plenty of the types of mortgages he favours available for their customers, before journalists come asking difficult questions about that.

On second thoughts, isn’t the government’s close involvement with a mortgage bank another very good reason why the Chancellor should have said nothing about mortgages to avoid any conflict of interest?

The main reason he seems to be offering us his thoughts is fear. He is afraid there will be a sharp fall in house prices. He does not seem to understand that it is in a way government policy to try to bring house prices down, as they are constantly telling us housing is not affordable and needs to become more affordable. He hopes that if more people take out fixed rate mortgages, more people will be able to pay the mortgage through difficult times. The only thing to be said about that is, at least he realises he is presiding over tricky times. Maybe spending a bit more time thinking about how to unstick them would be a better way to proceed. Lower interest rates will help. Lower interest rates make fixed rates a worse deal!

I was asked to write a piece on what the government should do next in the Northern Rock refinancing saga. Those most closely involved – the company, shareholders, the Bank of England and the government – will need to take professional advice on the legal, tax and investment complexities they have dug themselves into. The general position however, remains much simpler than those who clamour for nationalisation suppose. The government as main lender has all the power it needs to protect taxpayers, whcih should be its prime aim. I sent the following to the Guardian:

The government seems to have been mesmerised by shareholder power. I don’t know why. The truth of the position is simple. Northern Rock needs access to large sums of public money to keep its business going. There is no other source for this money in the short term. The government can therefore set out its terms.

It is wise to seek agreement with shareholders and the mortgage Bank, but foolish to underestimate the power in the government’s position. The taxpayer wants the government and the Bank of England to do a good deal, which saves the bank and ensures the taxpayer will get early repayment of the large sums with interest. The taxpayer should also be rewarded with stock warrants or options to give the taxpayer some share in success, if the rescue works well and the shares recover.

The rumoured decision to demand the end of the guarantee in three years rather than the originally floated five years changes the nature of the task any owner of Northern Rock faces. It means they need to generate more cash more quickly, or to be sure they can raise private finance more quickly. Assuming the government changed the terms on offer like this, it should ensure all potential bidders know, and each bidder has to be given a chance to change their bid in the light of the new circumstances. Presumably the government realises if they press for a shorter repayment period it will increase the pressure on management to cut costs, and may result in a smaller business. This does not mean it is wrong, as the taxpayer does want to know the money will be repaid sooner rather than later.

In order to decide between the competing bids, the shareholder representatives have to satisfy themselves they are recommending the best bid in the circumstances to improve shareholder value and give the business the best chance of future prosperity. It is not for the government to decide which bidder, but it is for the government to make its terms as Bank manager clear to all bidders. Given the scale of lending to the company the government has an effective veto on any bidder, as the government could decide (only if there were good reason) that a particular bidder did not satisfy the government that it was likely to be able to repay the loans in good time.

From the beginning the government has failed to tell us how much it has lent, what interest rate it will charge, when it will b e repaid and how much security it has taken for the loans. These are all elementary parts of good banking. Let us hope these necessary arrangements were made to protect the taxpayers’ interests. Now there is the chance of shareholders putting more money in, or a of a new plan by management to develop and finance the bank, the company needs to make a decision. To do so it needs to be sure how much money it can borrow for how long on what terms from the government. That will then help determine how quickly the business will have to be reduced in size to repay borrowings, and how much scope there is to try and trade their way out of cash shortage.

The Fed duly cut interest rates by another 50 basis points, taking them down to just 3%. We see recession fighting in full cry in the USA, where the Central Bank and the administration are uniting to pull the US economy out of its sharp slowdown.

Lower interest rates will ease some of the tensions in the housing market, allowing some people to carry on servicing mortgages which might have been too dear for them at higher rates. It makes it easier for all those businesses operating on borrowed money. It will also encourage a lower dollar, pricing US exporters back into world markets, and curbing the US appetite for imported products.

Meanwhile, on this side of the Atlantic, the authorities remain hesitant and divided over whether to carry on fighting inflation, or to see the Credit Crunch as the new enemy. UK rates are too high for comfort. Inflation will remain unpleasant this winter but will start to correct later in the year.

Yesterday the government published its review of the regulatory arrangements for banks in the wake of the Northern Rock crisis. They made suggestions and proposals in five areas:

1.” Strengthening the financial system” by introducing better risk management of banks and better supervision and rating of securitisation of loans.
2. “Reducing the likelihood of banks failing” by asking for more information and changing the arrangements for providing liquidity to banks.
3. “Reducing the impact of failing banks” by introducing a “Special resolution regime” by allowing the authorities to take action with a failing bank to achieve a rescue or orderly run off
4.”Effective compensation arrangements” including faster and bigger payments.
5. “Strengthening the Bank of England and improving coordination between authorities”.

The proposals combine the sensible with the foolish, mixing some important lessons learned with the sound of stable doors banging shut after the horse has gone.

I would suggest the government listens carefully to informed opinion before implementing these changes.

1. It is important to take action to improve the deposit protection regime, without requiring a large up front cash payment from existing banks at a time when they are struggling to re-establish strong balance sheets after the losses made on securitised loans.
2. The government should make the Bank more independent and stronger to deal with failing banks in the future. This requires transferring day by day banking supervision to the Bank of England, and transferring the necessary staff or recruiting the necessary staff with banking expertise to be able to do the job.
3. The “Special resolution regime” could give near nationalisation powers to the authorities without the need to compensate existing shareholders. These powers were not needed in previous rescues, as the Bank of England has a powerful position as only lender to a bank in trouble. It is difficult to see why they need all these extra powers. The one thing that does need clearing up is the legal power of the UK authorities to arrange rescues quickly and in private under current EU market regulation.
4. It is a moot point whether the Bank of England needs new legislation to clarify its powers and role, when it always used to be able to undertake these matters before many of its powers were taken away in the 1997-8 reorganisation. The availability of skilled and experienced staff in a banking and bank rescue is a more relevant consideration, given the removal of banking supervision from the Bank ten years ago.

As always, there is a danger of the authorities fighting the last war. There is no immediate prospect of another run on a bank. The current difficulties are those of a range of banks strapped for enough capital and cash, and a new aversion to risk as banks reveal losses on some of the paper they hold in the securitised and syndicated loans area. A sensible supervisor would be asking how can the regulatory burden be eased prudently at a time when banks have to recapitalise themselves. There is a danger that further capital adequacy and regulatory tightening, coupled with demands for up front levies for a compensation fund, will make it even more difficult to get the banks and the markets bank to balanced conditions, allowing a reasonable amount of credit to be advanced at sensible prices.

I will respond in more detail to the many individual consultation questions in the government document when I have had more time to consider all the detailed queries.

The Chancellor has promised a statement next week to try to sort out the regulatory mess that characterised the Northern Rock debacle.

What he needs to do is the following:

1. Ensure the Bank of England is more than just a monthly tea party for a group of academic economists sitting round talking about interest rates. The Bank needs to be given the power to direct and deal in government debt (currently with the Treasury).

2.The Bank needs to be a hands on operator in the money markets, so it does not allow in future the markets to become as illiquid as they were in August and September 2007, nor as loose as they were a year or more earlier. The Monetary Policy Committee became entirely academic last year when market rates diverged from MPS rates by up to 100 basis points. If the Bank is to set interest rates, it has to have all the powers and knowledge to operate successfully in money markets, to enforce the rates the MPC recommends.

2. Transfer banking supervision from the FSA to the Bank to allow the bank to operate properly in markets.This would ensure the Bank saw the main positions of the big banks daily, and understood the minute by minute pressures in money markets better.

3. Press for amendment of the EU MAD Directive to allow the Bank to organise rescues for ailing financial institutions in private and rapidly if needed.

4. Renegotiate Basel II to strike a better balance between off balance sheet and on balance sheet items, and to avoid Basel II becoming a further tightening of the capital rules at a time when banks are already finding it difficult to lend through balance sheet pressures.

5. Announce that the UK will not support any more EU regulations of financial services – there are too many new ones that have not yet bedded down, and we need a period of reflection and implementation to see how they will work.Some will need amendment or repeal, as they are too proscriptive and will drive busienss offshore from the EU.

6. Review the operation of the Rating agencies with other overseas jurisdictions, to see if they can operate more cautiously in future.

The sub prime crisis, a run on a UK mortgage bank, and now the loss of $7 billion dollars through rogue trades at Soc Gen: and still they say regulation works!

I accept that financial services businesses can be different. Where they take money from people, on the promise they will repay it at some date in the future, people need reassurance that the promise will be kept. In most other businesses the business takes the risk and supplies the good and service before the customer pays.

It makes sense to have deposit protection, and it should make sense to have some additional checks and requirements to reduce the risk that a business will steal people’s money, or will fail to keep enough capital to pay for losses and mistakes and still be able to give people their money back when they want it or are entitled to it.

This proposition has led to a vast regulatory industry, where clever regulators try to interfere in ever more details of the banks’ lives in the belief that this will prevent mistakes being made. As the last few months have shown, it does not work.

We need to ask how did the world regulators get it all so wrong, and what changes do we need to reduce risks in the future?

The biggest problem is the so-called sub prime crisis, which is in practise a world crisis, not just a US one, and is not confined to mortgages alone. It is a securitisation and off balance sheet crisis – too many banks packaged up too many loans born of the easy money conditions the authorities encouraged, and spread them around the system. The Regulators through their Basel I requirements positively encouraged this, asking for less capital if you securitised your lending and pushed it off your own balance sheet. This crisis should be called the Basel regulatory crisis, rather than the sub prime crisis.

The solution is for monetary authorities to be more careful about making money too easy – not that this is an immediate problem in the middle of the Credit crunch! They also need to revise rules over capital requirements, without lurching to a position where too much banking capital is required, intensifying the Credit Crunch. The whole thing is complicated by the move to Basel II, which needs urgent review in the light of current circumstances.

The run on Northern Rock was an unfortunate event for London. I do not agree with the MPs who say the FSA got it all wrong. As I understand it, the FSA was warning about the problems of Northern Rock well before the run on the bank began. The failure was a system failure, which owed a lot to the failure of the monetary authorities to keep money markets liquid, and to the dithering of the Chancellor who was meant to hold the ring and make the decisions in areas of overlap between the Bank and the FSA.

The UK government should decide that in future the Bank of England will get back its old powers to regulate banks and to run the government’s debt financing programme, so it once again sees the whole range of business going through the money markets. The Bank should have prime responsibility for banking the commercial banks, ensuring adequate liquidity in markets and avoiding any future run on a bank. They always used to be able to do this before Brown’s botched reforms.

The Soc Gen debacle is difficult to believe. Most banks make dealers deal in open dealing rooms where colleagues can hear what they are up to. I thought most require two signatures on larger deals, most have real time reporting through a common system, and anyone needing cash to pay margin or settle transactions would need someone else to certify or check the requirement. As the trader apparently acted without other authority he must have found ways to circumvent the checks in the system. The regulator presumably was completely unaware that such a thing was happening.

I do not think Regulators can stop a Soc Gen event. Only better internal controls and procedures in a bank can do that. The fact that Regulators cannot should make more people suspicious of the cry that what we need is more regulation. In this case what we needed was better bank management.

Three cheers for the Fed. One cheer for each 25 basis point cuts in interest rates announced as an emergency measure yesterday. It did the trick, limiting the savage market decline, and turning round the Asian markets which had been in freefall the previous day.

The US authorities have made it clear to the markets that they are going to stop a recession if it is in their power to do so. They have made aggressive moves in reducing interest rates. This will help a great deal. It means that many mortgage holders and companies in debt will now be able to afford their interest payments and repayments, improving the quality of the loan assets on the balance sheets of the banks and those held in securitised form. It means that all those financial companies that have borrowed so much to sustain the easy credit of earlier years will also have some relief on the amounts they have to pay in interest. The whole financial structure in the US is a little less unstable as a result of this development.

As I argued yesterday, two conditions need to be fulfilled for recovery to get underway. The first is lower interest rates. The second is the recapitalisation of the banks, so they have the stronger balance sheets they are going to need to lend people and companies more money again. This process can happen by the passage of time, as they trade profitably. It can be speeded up by cutting or cancelling dividend payments, or by raising new money from shareholders.

The gyrations of world markets in the last few days shows that the Indian, Chinese and Japanese markets are still very influenced by perceptions of the state of the US economy. All three are important exporters to the USA and are influenced to some extent by US conditions. The internal strength of the Indian and Chinese economies is becoming more obvious, but it is not thought sufficient to offset the full blown US recession which some market participants feared.

The Governor of the Bank of Englands remarks showed how far behind the plot the UK now is. The worse circumstances of the UK economy as a result of recent policy are now dragging it down relative to the US and the Asian giants. As the Governor pointed out, we have a bad inflation problem this winter. The governments own borrowing requirement was far too large before Northern Rock hit, only to be made far worse by the Northern Rock debacle. The big build up in UK public spending and borrowing, and the poor productivity of the enlarged public sector, all limit the UKs room for manoeuvre, at a time when the UK too needs lower interest rates to relive pressure on its financial system. The government is trying to control public spending at last by clumsy interventions on public sector pay, but still lacks a grip on large projects and staff numbers.

A recession can be averted in the US. The UK will experience a sharp slowdown, which will be made worse if the Chancellor presses on with plans to increase capital gains tax on entrepreneurs and with damaging plans to tax non doms too much.

The collapse of Stock markets around the world should come as no surprise. As readers of this blog will know, the years of easy credit were decisively ended last August when the financial community woke up to the reality of the securitised loans crisis, aided by the Central Banks at last in tighten mode after years of sloppy credit.

A credit crunch means there is little new credit available at a time when too many people and companies are desperate to sell assets to raise the cash they need. Investors with cash suddenly decide they want to hold more cash. Investors who have been investing on borrowed money have to rein back their activities and pay down debt. Banks that were able to lend people money and then package the loan up as security to sell to someone else suddenly find there are no buyers for these packages. As a result asset prices crash.

A credit crunch ends when two conditions are met. The Authorities have to signal they want easier credit by lowering interest rates, so high borrowings become affordable again. Banks have to sort their balance sheets out so they have the capacity to lend more. It is this latter condition which may take some time to get right this time round, because so many banks have been involved in syndicated credits and in trying to put their loans off balance sheet in structured vehicles. The sooner the banks sort out what all these investments are worth, write them down, and raise the new capital they are going to need to be able to carry on their business, the better.

The weakness of banks is not solely a US phenomenon, and the so called sub prime crisis is not just a US or a property related difficulty. This is a crisis in the global banking system, where there are worries about the Bank of China as well as about the European and US commercial banks. They have to contract their balance sheets as they value their loans more realistically, and then many of them will need new capital ??whether by cutting dividend payments and keeping more of their profits, or raising new money directly by selling new shares to shareholders. Doubtless the worlds regulators, led no doubt by the UK authorities, will make it even more difficult to by tightening the rules on capital adequacy at exactly the wrong point of the cycle.

The worlds economies are in different conditions to meet this sudden lurch from easy money to tight money. The Italian and Spanish economies are going to be made to suffer for their membership of the Euro, with interest rates and money growth dictated from Frankfort leading to painful adjustments in their domestic economies. The US economy is so far mainly suffering in the real estate and banking sectors, with some signs of a good export led recovery emerging in other sectors from the lower dollar. The UK economy is badly placed, thanks to the very high public deficit and poor productivity performance of the much bloated public sector. The bungled approach to money markets and banking which uniquely gave London the only run on a bank does not help either. If the Chancellor follows this up by taxing the rich out of London then we will have a major residential property price collapse to add to the current woes. The Indian and Chinese economies may find exporting to the US and the West more difficult, but they have the cushion of rapidly growing domestic demand and China has the huge foreign exchange reserves its successful exporting has built up in recent years.

We have seen a sharp contraction in real estate in the US, in Spain, and in commercial property in the UK. We are now seeing a sharp fall in share prices, as investors adjust to the new reality that banks and property companies will find it difficult to maintain earnings, and as the growth rate of the worlds main economies slows.

There remains plenty to worry about. Some are still worrying about the price rises that are coming through this winter as a result of the years of easy money. Others are worried looking forward, fearing a recession in the US and elsewhere. I still think a full blown US recession unlikely, and do not see an inflation problem looking out a year, but recognise that these fears will remain real to many unless and until my two conditions are met for a recovery.

There will be growing pressure on the US, UK and European authorities to lower interest rates, and lower rates will help. There also needs to be a concerted drive to clean up banksbalance sheets and establish some kind of a market in all of these securitised loans that characterised the years of easy money. Once we can know what is left on banks balance sheets, markets can get on with the necessary task of recapitalising the banks so more normal credit conditions can be recreated.

PS: The Fed’s move today to cut interest rates by 75 basis points, taking them down in one go from 4.25% to 3.5% is a good start.

I am glad to have won the battle against Vince Cable to avoid nationalisation of Northern Rock. I am grateful to the Jeremy Vine programme and the Week In Westminster for giving airtime to the case against nationalisation. Their commonsense and fairness shows up the lamentable performance of the Today programme, the World at One and Pm who gave ample platforms to the pro nationalisation case but refused me the opportunity to explain why it was a bad idea, and to offer a more positive alternative.

In the arguments with editors I was told that my proposals were unlikely to be taken up, whereas nationalisation was the likely outcome. I explained that the government had to come up with something better than nationalisation because nationalisation would have wrecked the borrowing and spending figures. The BBCs flagship programmes as always remained wedded to an old fashioned state solution and to the Lib Dems, so their listeners were not made aware that there was a better way, and were in ignorance that the governments advisers were working on it.

I am pleased this morning that the government has decided to

1. Avoid nationalisation
2. Get some cash back more quickly by selling bonds to replace the loans
3. Seek a new private sector owner
4. Take an equity stake via warrants to give the taxpayer some profit if it recovers well.

What I want to see in addition is

1. Proper banking disciplines enforced to repay the borrowings. Northern Rock still needs an injection of tough banking controls to make it work.
2. A phased withdrawal of the guarantees ?? we dont just want the cash back, we also want to get the taxpayer off risk
3. A fair competition allowing in new bidders ?? as the basis for bidding is now very different from before Christmas. Otherwise there could be legal challenges.

The government needs to:

1. Get a grip on its lending to Northern Rock and set out how and when it will be getting money back from this bank.
2. Remove wasteful and unpopular public spending, like ID cards, regional government, extra contributions to the EU, too many spin doctors and consultancy contracts.
3. Start applying pressure to raise public sector productivity in those areas where we do need spending. Impose a staff freeze on the civil service.
4. Cancel the increase in CGT from 10% to 18%, and leave the new 18% rate in place of 40%.
5. Issue more index linked bonds to finance the remaining deficit, as inflation will come down after this winter’s fuel and food rises.
6.Create an employee ownership scheme for the Post Office and press ahead with its privatisation involving employees.
7. Open the water industry up to competition, to bring prices down and open up new supplies and new investment.
8. Get on with commissioning private sector investment in energy capacity by granting the necessary licenses and planning permission.
9. Introduce more private capital into railways, reuniting track and train in regional private companies.
10. Call a halt to the overregulation of financial services from Brussels, and put through deregulatory legislation which starts to lift the burdens on business.

This programme would at one and the same time

1.Lower prices by using competition to cut monopoly prices
2.Increase investment in infrastructure where we are short of capacity by harnessing private capital
3.Reduce public sepnding
4.Allow lower interest rates as a result of 1 and 3 above.

<p> The idea that Northern Rock loans will be packaged and sold to the private sector is not a solution to the crisis, especially as there will be a government guarantee on them. Instead, this represents a decision by the government to lengthen the period over which it is prepared to lend to Northern Rock.</p>
<p> It means that all interested bidders wanting to buy a share of the action in Northern should; be invited to rebid, as the terms on which they are bidding are now so much better than they were. It appears that a bidder now has the government as its bank manager, guaranteeing substantial lending, for a long time period. This is a much better proposition than the one they sought bids for before Christmas.</p>
<p> No-one writing up the story seems to grasp the importance of adopting the recommendations that readers of this blog know well, recommendations to the government and Bank of England to get a grip as Northerns most important bank managers.</p>
<p> Whether Northern is to be nationalised, sold to a private bidder or remain independent, the need is the same. It is high time the authorities toughened up the terms of their lending to Northern Rock, and set out a timetable for repayment that is demanding but realistic. It should be up to the management to decide if they can repay from trading profits and cash, or if they need to sell assets to meet the demands for money back by the taxpayers.</p>
<p> I find it almost unbelievable that Mr Darling and the Bank should make maybe £55 billion of loans and guarantees available to Northern Rock with no public statement of how long they can have the money for, how the asset cover has been secured, and when the money has to be repaid. All these things should be public because they have such a big impact on public spending, and so bidders can form a proper view of the value and the liquidity of the business. More worrying is the likelihood that there is no private agreement about how and when the loans will be repaid. What private sector banker would ever lend large sums to a distressed company without first asking and answering the questions How and When do I get my money back?</p>
<p> The governments decision to back the "solution" of selling bonds to the private sector to release cash to the government that it has lent to Northern would work well if there were no government guarantee, but the existence of the guarantee keeps the taxpayer on risk. At the very least if they wish to go this route they should look at time limiting the guarantee, or phasing it out.</p>
<p> This could prove to a dear way of avoiding the ruin of nationalisation. Maybe one day the Treasury will wake up and understand that they have a banking problem. The way out is by applying proper banking disciplines to this business, and making the shareholders and directors of Northern Rock confront the simple truth either they trade their way out of the borrowings, or they sell assets to repay the borrowings. Nationalisation, or lengthening the terms of the loans and guaranteeing them take the pressure off the management. A sensible bank manager with that much money at risk with a single client would want to hold their feet to the fire, not let them off in the way the latest proposal does.</p>

Things are bad enough without talking ourselves into recession.
Some banks and commentators have already called a recession in the USA, when the figures for the last quarter of 2007 show the US economy was still growing well. Here in the UK the retailers have added to the sense of gloom by concentrating on their sales figures on a ??like for like?? basis, leaving out all the sales in new shops.

The current position is both better than the pundits admit, and worse than the government will let on. The bad news is that the banking systems in both the USA and the UK are damaged by discovering that some of the lending they carried out in the heady days of low interest rates and easy money has been in their balance sheets at values that can no longer be sustained. We are living through a difficult time as banks adjust for the losses they have made, and rein in their lending as they are short of cash. In the UK commercial property values are falling fast, undermining the security for some of the loans. Residential property values are under attack from the UK government, who want housing to be more ??affordable??, but are being held up in part by the high Stamp duties and the imposition of Home Information Packs which is deterring people from selling their homes and buying a different one. There are too few homes coming onto the market at the moment to cause a crash in prices. The UK authorities have made the problem worse by their ham fisted approach to Northern Rock and by their failure to keep markets liquid enough during the last four months of 2007.

The good news is that many companies are still trading well. Profit margins are good in many cases, and on both sides of the Atlantic activity is higher overall today than it was when the Credit crunch first hit. Both the US and the UK have experienced a falling currency. As both economies need to divert much more activity into exports, or into import substitution, that will help. Both economies can export so much more to the rich parts of the world ?? China, India, Russia and the Middle East. Both economies now have to seek inward investment from these new giants that have built up huge cash surpluses at the same time as we have built up huge deficits by buying their oil and their manufactures. It is repayment time.

Few forecasters expect a downturn in the UK this year ?? just a sharp slowdown. Some commentators expect the US to get away with a slowdown rather than a recession. The US Fed is very keen to stop a slump, and is taking the right action by making cash available to banks and by cutting interest rates. Now the US President is also promising tax cuts, would boost activity as well. The US authorities recognised earlier than the UK that they had to shift from inflation fighting to recession fighting, and they have been bolder in their actions. They will probably succeed in avoiding recession.

The UKs position is weaker because the UK has increased public spending by too much, wasting too much of the money. At a time when other countries were reining in their public deficits and controlling their spending, the UK government went on a spending binge. This limits the UK governments scope to cut taxes and relieve the pressure on consumers. As consumption is the largest part of activity, this means we are going to experience a slowdown which consumers will feel badly. If the government really wanted to help us out of this change of fortune, it would get a better grip on its spending immediately, cancelling the needless parts like ID cards, computerisation schemes, regional government, and larger EU contributions as well as keeping wages down. Then it could follow the US example and cut taxes to help the hard pressed private sector.

Instead the UK is only going to tackle one of the twin deficits, the balance of payments one, through the mechanism of a cheap pound. Our best hope this year is that the strategy works and the private sector does shift a lot of activity into exports. That could be helped if the government would relent on its planned increases in small business tax and CGT. They need the goodwill of entrepreneurs to right the imbalances in this economy. Its a dangerous time for the government to be sandbagging the very people on whom they rely to recreate their much quoted ??economic stability??. Our economy at the moment is as stable as a row boat in a storm.

There is no need to talk ourselves into recession ?? we can get through with a period of slow growth. To do so, the government needs to curb its own appetite for waste and be realistic about how much it can squeeze out of us in tax.

What price an ethical foreign policy?

Today sees Mr Brown in China trying to act as a super salesman for British business. It is a relatively harmless use of his time, forced upon him by the dire straits of the UK economy under his policies.

Mr Brown has debauched the strong economy he inherited. His first couple of years wisely continued Conservative spending plans and repaid public debt, but elsewhere the long march of this government to a malfunctioning socialist economy had begun. The undermining of the Bank of England proved to be a long fuse to the explosive Northern Rock crisis. The taxation of pension funds began the route march to most people no longer having the benefit of a final salary scheme, whilst burdening too many companies with large deficits to repay.

Worse followed after 2001 when Mr Brown embarked on an irresponsible twin track ?? easy money, and massive spending increases on public services. Because he wrongly saw all public spending as ??investment?? and felt large sums were proof of better service, he failed to ask the obvious question ??What am I buying for all this cash??? The answer turns out to be a whole load of extra civil servants, spin doctors, consultancy contracts, pay awards, quangos and regulators.

Ten years on the UK is one of the world leaders for twin deficits ?? a record balance of payments deficit, and a large government borrowing requirement. Alarmed by the record deficits on the balance of trade figures which he used to pour over to harry the Conservatives when in government, he decided on a trip to China. It is a sign of his desperation that he feels the need to act as pied piper to the British business community to sell more there, and to see the need to ask the Chinese government for more Chinese funds to be invested in the UK. He is right we require the money, to pay for our double deficits.

When the Labour government first came into office its then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook claimed they would run an ethical foreign policy. The phrase was chosen to imply that all previous UK foreign policies had been other than ethical. The Labour knight was to wear the purest white, and would charge into world Councils with morality as the billowing pennant on the lance.

Today that seems a very long time ago. We look back on the invasion of Iraq, the continuing fighting in Afghanistan, the lack of any action over Zimbabwe, the skirting round North Korea, the inconsistent approach to other countries gaining nuclear weapons and the erratic response to human rights abuses and have to ask what ethical or moral stance now lies behind these actions? Arent they all driven by media, by events, by US pressure, by EU argument, by a growing sense in the present Foreign Office that there are many obvious limits to British power?

Worse still, when many want Mr Brown to raise Chinas human rights record as the central issue whilst there is still a window of opportunity before the Olympics, many of us are embarrassed to say this when we look at the deteriorating record of human rights in our own country. Now the UK wants to have the western record for detention without trial or charge, seeks to stifle public opinion by ratting on the promise of a referendum, spends a fortune on clumsy physical ??security?? at so many places and events, treats travellers like suspects or criminals and intensifies the range of thought crimes that preoccupy the elite, we are no longer in a good position to lecture China even if we wanted to.

Mr Browns visit recognises the reality of the new world order. China is emerging as a superpower, with a fast growing economy, a large population, and a wish to project its power. When a country has more than $1 trillion in the bank it is difficult to argue with it, especially when our country has been newly impoverished by Mr Browns policies. He sold our gold holdings for a fraction of its current market value, ransacked our long term savings, failed to stop a run on a British bank and now needs to go cap in hand to China to seek inward investment to the UK. These are sorry times for our country. They have been brought on by incompetent stewardship of our money. It is humiliating to see our Prime Minister ask for sovereign wealth fund money from China to keep us afloat. If he really wanted to improve the UK economy he should have stayed at home, working on how to get more value from his public spending, and how he could curb spending so we do not need to borrow so much.