John Redwood's Diary
Incisive and topical campaigns and commentary on today's issues and tomorrow's problems. Promoted by John Redwood 152 Grosvenor Road SW1V 3JL

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Say No to EU Re set

The outlines of Re Set are clear. It is all give and no take for the UK. The EU sets unrealistic red lines and the UK comes round to capitulating.
1. Joining  Erasmus will cost £800 m year for a worse student scheme than our own all UK  based Turing. UK taxpayers will be paying a majority of their money to EU students.
2. UK Universities will probably lose big sums by having to cut  their fees to EU students down to the much lower UK student fee  level.
3. We surrender £6 bn of fish which we should be fishing for ourselves and processing in the UK.
4. We will have to increase our carbon taxes and emissions costs by aligning with the dearer EU scheme.
5.We will have to accept a Mobility scheme for under 30 s, increasing pressure on homes and jobs for young people in the UK. There will be far more EU people coming to the UK than British people going to the EU.
6. We will impose carbon based tariffs or taxes on non EU imports, making UK business less competitive and squeezing UK consumers
7. We will burden every business in the UK with more EU rules  and costs needlessly. The minority that export to the EU already comply for their exports, just as any exporter has to meet any other foreign requirements in markets they sell to.
8.The EU will send us a big bill for administration and for a “ solidarity” payment. How much will the new EU tax be to pay  for it?
9. The UK may have to water down  its higher animal welfare standards to comply with EU farm trade rules.
10. More taxes, more laws, more tariffs on non  EU means less growth, not more. Why make us poorer by hitching us to a slow growth region whose own Draghi Report says is failing to compete with the US and China?

Speech on reorganising the NHS

My Lords, Amendment 94 invites us to support the idea of integration and collaboration, led by the ICBs, between all the other health bodies in their area. These are two rather different words. Integration is a very popular word with those who are doing the integrating. They assume that their view will prevail, that they have the perfect answer for an integrated service and that they will make the wise decisions. But those who are being integrated might not see it like that. They might feel that the integration plan dilutes their role. It may damage their approach to the problem, which may be a perfectly reasonable approach, or it may even entail the loss of their job. The integrators normally get the good jobs; the anti-integrators are usually the ones on the losing side.

It would be a pity to put into legislation a requirement that ICBs had to develop a plan for integrating local services when they might have much more pressing things to do, to sort out the quality of the services for which they are directly responsible. There may be no easy integrated plan that carries sufficient support or can be carried through without dislocation and damage to local services.

It is more difficult to disagree with collaboration. It is a very warm word. Many of us here like to collaborate more than we go in for political disagreement. It is one of the characteristics of your Lordships’ House, which means that we can quite often make a contribution by working together. But the danger of embedding collaboration as a supreme virtue into this legislation is that there have been quite a lot of examples in the past—under Governments of all different hues—of collaborative working between different parts of the public sector, under loosely organised arrangements, so that no one is ever to blame.

What then happens is that, instead of the collaborative working getting rid of the gaps in service or making sure that people do not fall down the gaps, there are gaps in service that none of the participants in the collaborative scheme feels it is their duty to fill; or they assume wrongly that someone else is filling it. We then have disasters, and inquiries that identify that there were strategic problems. They say it was a system failure because no one in the collaborative system—often there are many well-paid people in the collaborative system—placed themselves in a position where they took responsibility and, therefore, could take the blame.

Again, I think we should proceed with caution on an amendment that, well-intentioned though it is, suggests that there is some new, higher level of collaboration out there, which has not far been achieved, that would be uniquely virtuous and uniquely wise, capable of filling gaps and dealing with service deficiencies. If you have systems that are completely integrated under a single controlling mind—or, more often, a group controlling mind—it is then difficult to get innovation and positive change, and it is difficult for people who have been badly handled by that system to get proper redress. The system closes around and defends itself. It defends all its actions, both upwards, for those above at Secretary of State level who might criticise, and certainly downwards, where patients are harmed or do not get the service they want but are told that all is perfect because, “Isn’t it wonderful that we have an integrated collaborative service?” I rest my case.

My Conservative Home article. How covid changed many things

The pandemic was a tragedy for too many families who lost loved ones, and for many whose jobs and businesses were disrupted by what occurred. Ministers had to make rapid decisions with little information to rely on, as experts sought to fight a new disease they did not understand. We all live with the consequences both of the disease and of the dramatic and unusual  response governments in the West made to it.
The UK’s policies  to tackle  covid destroyed the 2019-2024  UK government, splitting the party and the top Ministerial team. Ministers  were popular in the early stages when most people were very worried about the disease. Most  liked the way the Central Bank and Treasury printed money and dished out large sums to many people and companies to stay at home and do nothing productive. As the crisis wore on the Conservative rebellions over the extensive and long lasting lockdowns got bigger in the Commons as we moved from a handful of MPs  to over 100 who thought the lockdowns were not saving lives but were doing economic damage. The communist style approach to directing everyone’s lives and movements palled. The financial excesses were destined to be inflationary when recovery got under way.
The inner cabinet warred between the side that wanted more lock down as the main approach to the disease  and the side that wanted to  relax controls to  save more of the economy . One side  did not think lockdowns did protect enough people and did not stop the spread of the virus whilst they did great economic damage. The Chancellor was pitted against the Health Secretary.
As a concerned backbencher myself  there many things to worry about. There was the constitutional revolution with senior officials fronting national news conferences.  I attended many of the on line meetings which we requested  to know what was going on. They too were dominated by the senior health officials with many Ministers acting as aimable chairmen selecting who could ask a question but rarely venturing an answer. We did not see senior officials representing the economy/normal life side of the argument, only the health policy side.They were bound to recommend ever stronger and longer lockdown without much thought for everything else that endangered.
The role of the Minister should be to listen to advice from the health officials, from the covid experts and from those with wider considerations. Ministers then have to balance the arguments, decide the priorities. They should have carried on in the usual way presenting the final decisions themlseves that  they reached to people and Parliament. If they wanted full long lockdown they needed to set out how serious the health threat was and explain how you could contain transmission by lockdown. If they saw the big damage being done to the economy  they needed to find how more economic activity could be allowed without harming the vulnerable who were mainly the elderly.
I worried about the inflationary consequences of the third huge round of money printing and bond  buying well into the recovery when another £150 bn was thrown into circulation. Output was unable to  match the extra cash. Throughout the crisis the problem was not shortage of demand requiring more spending, but shortage of supply through lockdowns. I was concerned by the way waiting lists for any medical condition other than covid were building up to alarming levels. Was the death rate going up for other conditions?
I was surprised that the NHS did not make sufficient use of all the extra capacity they had access to for non covid treatments. The state had bought up most of the capacity of the private hospital system. The private sector could not use the facilities for their own patients who joined the ever longing waiting lists, whilst often the operating theatres and consulting rooms in covid free buildings were not used.  I was annoyed that Ministers who did get through the Nightingale hospitals allowed them to go  largely unused. Part of the NHS workforce showed great dedication, courage and hard work to handle all the covid cases whilst others were stood down as the main NHS  hospitals understandably  just concentrated on the pandemic.
The long and expensive enquiry has seemed more interested in the political interplay and the possible personal shortcomings of some Ministers than with understanding the wider problems the pandemic response created.   It should be asking how many lives did lockdown save, given that many people did end up catching the virus. It should be concentrating on the spread of infections in care homes and hospitals and how better airflow control with  ultra violet filtering could have helped. Why were vulnerable patients moved around, sometimes into danger? Could more have been done to isolate and protect the elderly who were the main sufferers? Was it really necessary to shut all the schools when young people were at little risk?
As the pandemic response raged on constituents split into three blocs. One minority wanted longer and tougher lock downs as they were scared of the virus. A second minority bloc thought the whole response was over the top and wanted permission to rescue their businesses or get back to their jobs. The majority accepted the advice of the government but became more critical the longer it went on as  more criticisms started to emerge of what had happened.
The Labour and Lib Dem opposition parties did not come up with better ways of handling the crisis and were usually urging more lockdown and the expenditure of even more money on the never never of artificially cheap debt. They did not warn about the likely coming inflation nor about the way we would lose a lot of self employed and small businesses who lost their income and customers.They did not pursue the big build up of delays for non covid treatments.  Many business people decided on early  retirement, cutting the capacity of the economy to recover.
As the crisis drew to an end the opposition whipped up anger about people and companies who had exploited the easy money and the generous grants. They railed against the high costs and sometimes low quality of the bought in protective clothing which had been in  world wide shortage. They forgot that all these decisions were made in great haste  with the same Opposition demanding more supplies sooner, whatever the cost.
The main economic legacy of the pandemic policies was the big surge in inflation brought on by excessive money, cheap loans and public borrowing. The surge in oil prices was blamed, but UK inflation was three times target before Putin invaded Ukraine, whilst it stayed low in energy importing China and Japan. Labour played the cost of living card well to undermine the Conservatives, though they had backed the policies that caused it and wanted more. There was also some permanent loss of capacity and output. Attitudes to work and working from home were greatly changed by the long lay off.
By the time of the 2024 election inflation was back down to target. It is surging again thanks to Labour’s inflation of public sector costs, spending and borrowing. Growth had resumed during  the last 6 months of the Conservatives with the UK growing the fastest of the G7. None of that mattered. The electors had made up their mind. Their experience of lockdown, high inflation and the dislocation of public services caused by the pandemic response was enough to confine that Conservative government to history. The public now watches as the former Opposition who had wanted more of the wrong responses to covid now just make things worse. They did not learn from the experiences that they used  to push the Conservatives out of office.

Alan Milburn is right about the need to get young people into work,, wrong about how

It is a shared aim of all the main parties. We need to get more young people into work and off benefits. Alan Milburn identifies the problem again for us, and urges government action. So far so good. He then recommends increased public spending on artificial job creation and tells us it might be ten years before we see the savings. Wrong.

The first thing you need to get young people into work is jobs. This obvious truth seems to elude the left, who delight in more rules, more laws, more taxes, more costs being heaped on business. They then wonder why there is a shortage of jobs to go round. Seeing this Mr Milburn suggests subsidies to firms to provide job experience make do jobs for a few months for young peo0ple to give them some idea of work. That will not help. What a prospect for a young person to have to play act a job for a short time, knowing the employer cannot afford to take them on and keep them on the payroll owing to higher National Insurance, higher Business rates, more Employment law and all the other anti growth measures this government has taken.

Labour delight in creating a money go round. The main flow is from working taxpayers to the growing army of benefit recipients. There are then the bizarre flows, taking more and more money away from businesses and then giving small packets back if they will reinstate some of the things they used to do before the tax theft. Get rid of the NI and rates hikes and business would create more jobs again. Put in the right incentives into the tax and benefit system and more young people would apply for those jobs.

EU Re set sell out means dearer energy, higher prices and slower growth

The UK give away to Brussels already encompasses   £800 m a year for joining Erasmus which will subsidise more EU students than UK ones, and a £6 bn give away over 12 years of fish  we should catch and land in the UK for processing instead.

It will be very damaging to join the EU emissions trading and carbon tax system, putting up energy prices and the  cost of energy intensive  imports.

The City which wisely wants to keep out of alignment with excessive EU rules needs to warn the government off  accepting EU rules for electricity futures and contracts trading.The EU can use that to lever their wider financial rules in.

The BBC Radio 4 did a half hour on Re set yesterday lunch time. Usual cast of UK  establishment remainers. A Chinese interviewee did a good job explaining the poor economic performance of the EU falling further and further behind US and China especially in digital. The BBC did at last mention the excoriating Draghi Report which I have often referred to which led many months ago to  the EU policy ( mimicked here) of a 25% cut in business regulation . Ever since there and here there has been a continuous big expansion in new laws and regulations to inflict more  harm  on growth and business. The  EU is always grabbing more legal powers. It only ever repeals when it wants to replace a law with more powerful wider ranging  one.Why do they tell such fairy stories?The EU keeps on grabbing power and legislating. That is why it is falling further and further behind and has watched as the US unleashes the digital revolution.

My speech on the big bond losses. ( edited)

My Lords, I wish the maiden speakers well today. Time does not permit me to give a sensible commentary  or good advice on a very complex Budget with so many small measures. Let  me just endorse the remarks of my noble friend on the Front Bench, who provided excellent analysis and very good policy advice, having had a little bit more time to do so.

Let me instead press the Minister on a very important topic that hardly ever gets debated, which is at the heart of our fiscal and monetary policy. The OBR’s latest forecast says that between 2022, when the APF last made a profit, and 2033, when it thinks the bulk of the bonds will have been sold by the PPF,the total losses will be over £220 billion. The forecast loss for 2027-28 is £14.6 billion. When I last asked the Minister about this, I was told that the Bank of England is independent, and therefore he could not give an answer on these subjects.

I refer the Minister to some correspondence on 17 September this year, when very major changes were announced in the handling of the £482 billion of bonds still held in the APF at the Bank of England. The Chancellor’s letter to the governor expressly says that he is authorising the changes, and the letter goes on to chronicle how, quite properly, there have been very serious and probably lengthy negotiations between the Treasury and the Bank about how these matters are going to be handled. I think the Commons and the Lords deserve a proper, detailed Statement from the Minister and the Government on what will be the fiscal and monetary consequences of the changes that have been agreed or are still being negotiated.

There are two in particular that time might allow me to mention. First, the decision has been made that £120 billion of longer-dated paper will no longer be sold under the quantitative tightening programme. I believe that they will rest in the APF, which means that the APF will have to last for several decades pending their eventual redemption by the Treasury. I would like to know why they are doing that. I might even agree with it—it may make some sense—but we should know the numbers and the background of how that will probably help the fiscal position.

Then there is the decision, which is still not fully detailed but which I think they intend to go ahead with about future sales of the medium-dated bonds. They will not be sold in the market next year and thereafter but sold direct to the Treasury. Why has the Chancellor accepted this and why does he wish to buy these bonds himself, direct into the Treasury? They will obviously be bought at the market price, not at the original purchase price, so it will trigger the need for the Treasury to send the loss money to the Bank of England. It will also mean that the DMO, the organisation controlled by the Treasury that issues new debt, will have to issue considerably more new debt to cover the costs of purchasing the bonds from the Bank of England. This is complicated and it does not make headlines, but these are very big numbers being moved around. We deserve an explanation of why they think it is worth moving these things around like this, and whether there is any point in doing it, given the size of the losses, which are probably going to be very big, however you arrange the accounting around them.How much extra new  debt will they issue?

Some say that these losses do not matter and that it is all very technical, a shift between government and the Bank all within the wider public sector. That misleads as it is a long-term transfer from the public sector and taxpayers to the private sector. Those people and institutions who were bright enough to sell their bonds at very high prices to the Bank and Treasury—when they were offering ridiculously high prices—will be the beneficiaries if they now buy the bonds back from the Bank and the Treasury at much lower prices. So they have a very large profit, which matches the very large loss for the taxpayer. I ask the Government to come clean and give us some explanation—what went wrong and how are they paying the bills? What will the the impact on the government’s budget ex the Bank of England? What is the impact on money and credit? Is the idea to relax money policy a bit, and to reduce losses that have to be paid for by the Treasury?

The need to change the Fiscal framework. My IEA article

The UK fiscal framework
16 years ago the Coalition government with George Osborne as Chancellor set up a new architecture for UK budgets and economic management. The Bank of England was confirmed as setting the base rate of interest, making independent forecasts of the economy and inflation and regulating the financial stability of commercial banks.
The Treasury had to share information with a newly set up Office of Budget Responsibility who have the tasks of costing government policies and programmes and forecasting the impact of government measures and taxes on the economy, debt and deficit. From  the OBR’s work the government sets itself targets or Fiscal rules seeking to constrain deficits and to control the level of total state indebtedness. The OBR forecasts how well the government will do in relation to the Rules and usually concludes it will hit the targets.
The government sold this approach on the basis that so called “independent” bodies, the Bank and OBR, would ensure discipline so that the country could keep inflation to the target of 2% per annum, and could prevent excessive deficits and debts building up.
The system had some apparent success for the period 2010 to 2019 when government itself sought to keep spending and borrowing under reasonable control. A benign period in world trade with China greatly expanding her offers of cheaper goods helped keep inflation down globally so the Bank’s task was easier. Many western countries were knowingly or unwittingly restraining the growth in money and credit as they took a tough stance on commercial banks after the excesses of the banking crash of 2008. It was a period of disinflation after the big build up in money, debt and credit prior to 2007 allowed by lax bank regulation and poor Central banking in the West.
 In 2020 covid struck. The three main Western Central banks, the Fed, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England all embarked on creating large sums to buy bonds, driving interest rates down to new lows. As an initial response to the collapse of supply through lockdowns, this was helpful. All three continued with it for too long on too large a scale, triggering rapid rises in inflation by 2022. The Central banks blamed the price rises on the outbreak of the Ukraine war and its impact on energy and grain supplies.
The Swiss, Japanese and Chinese Central Banks that did not announce new policies to  greatly expand balance sheets to buy bonds and depress rates presided over low inflation throughout this period, showing that inflation was a choice wrongly made by the western Central Banks and governments.
No-one should be complacent about the dreadful loss of direction in  UK public finances and inflation since 2020. In every year of the last five years the Bank of England has turned a blind eye to inflation above its target. It allowed a peak inflation more than five times target.
The OBR and the derived rules to keep debt and deficits down have failed, with UK state debt now three times the level in 2010 and surging all this decade. The Conservative government of 2019-24 greatly boosted spending and borrowing to see the economy through the collapse of lock down for covid. It had started to rein in when it lost heavily in the election.  The incoming Labour government decided the outgoing government had not been spending, taxing and borrowing enough and made a large increase in all three in their first two years. The results are a runaway debt with interest charges now rising rapidly as the stock of debt increases and as older debt needs to be borrowed anew at much higher rates of interest. For two years running  now longer term government borrowing rates have been well above the worst day under Liz Truss.
The Bank of England sets itself up to fail by ignoring money and credit trends. The mis named Monetary Policy Committee tries to forecast the economy based on a view of how much UK capacity there is and how close to capacity the economy is running. If employment levels are high it expects higher wage settlements and seeks to offset it with higher interest rates to cool lending and activity. If unemployment is high it tends to want lower rates to act as a boost. This ignores the fact that the UK imports a lot, so world prices and wages are important for marginal purchases rather than depending on UK capacity. It ignores the way that extra money and credit can boost inflation even when too many people are unemployed or UK steel mills and car factories lack orders owing to UK costs and net zero policies.
The OBR is set up to fail because the Fiscal Rules set a target to see debt falling as a percentage of GDP only in the third year of the forecast, and to control the deficit only in the third year. The third year never comes as it is a rolling target revised each year as a new year is brought in. Government can comply without ever having to impose the spending cuts or extra taxes that are implied in Year 3 of the forecast.
So what should be done to give the UK a fiscal framework that would encourage low inflation and properly controlled debt? Both Bank and Treasury should be set the 2% inflation target, as government needs to do its bit to keep inflation down. Much of our current high inflation is caused by high public sector wage cost allied to poor public sector productivity. Both should also be set a 2% growth target to remind them that growth is a crucial aim and can help keep deficits and inflation under control. More investment can bring more efficient new capacity on stream. Faster growth reduces unemployment and boosts tax revenues.
Neither the OBR nor the Bank are independent bodies. The Bank needs permission to buy and sell bonds through the APF, receives Treasury payments to offset its huge losses (forecast by OBR to be £228 bn 2022-2033)  and has a Governor who reports to Parliament and is appointed by the government. The OBR works closely with the Treasury, is state funded and cannot become a critic of government policy. The Bank needs to put money and credit into its models and get better at forecasting and tackling latent inflation. The OBR needs to tell the government to introduce a control on debt and deficits that is more likely to work than the current failed 3 year out non targets. The big rise in debt is worrying and will eventually force a major change of policy when the debt becomes unaffordable.

No budget for British Steel losses?

I asked in the Lords yesterday

 

“What is the Government’s budget for steel losses this year and next? Will all that money be diverted from the steel modernisation provision in the current Budget?”

Baroness Lloyd of Effra
(Lab)

“The Government took action to stabilise operations at British Steel. We have appointed a new chair and asked him and the board to bring forward a transformation plan. Once that has been agreed, we will be in a better position to set out the long-term future, to attract private sector investment and to understand what this means for long-term public sector finance.”

Follow up questions were also blocked. Surely the government has a budget for the public spending costs of nationalised British  Steel. We have been told it is losing £1.3 m a day and continues to trade thanks to money from the government said to be the provision of working capital.

It is unacceptable that government has been in control of this business for more than a year and a half, still does not have a Business plan, and is unable to tell us how they will get the losses down. Taxpayers have to pay  the losses to keep it going. It looks as if a £2.5 bn budget allocation for steel modernisation is being raided for these payments. The idea of the budget line was meant to be grants and loans to support the provision of new investment,  particularly  to build electric arc furnaces to replace blast furnaces.

The Treasury do not explain their new policy on bonds and the money supply

I have pointed out before that on 17 September the Chancellor wrote an important letter  to the Bank Governor granting permission and expressing agreement to the Bank now holding £120 bn of long bonds showing big losses at current prices instead of selling them, and agreeing to the Treasury buying up the other bonds instead of selling them in the market.

When I asked the Lords  Minister why they were doing this I was wrongly told the Bank is independent. The Chancellor’s letter implies the opposite. Clearly the Chancellor has to agree to the Treasury buying the bonds and he has a big interest in when bonds are sold and at how big a loss as the Treasury has to pay  for all losses.

Indeed the Chancellor makes clear his crucial role.

“The APF has been authorised by my predecessors to hold assets, primarily for monetary policy
purposes. In addition, and as set out below, I am today authorising a segregated portfolio of
APF gilts to be held for non-monetary policy purposes. Under the terms of the existing APF
indemnity, HM Treasury will continue to indemnify the Bank and the Bank of England Asset
Purchase Facility Fund (BEAPFF), so that any gains or losses arising out of, or in connection with,
the APF, including in relation to this segregated portfolio of APF gilts, are borne by HM Treasury.”

So why is he approving a segregated portfolio. Won’t this have to remain within the APF? Otherwise wouldn’t the APF have to transfer the bonds to another owner, triggering the losses and the Treasury guarantee against loss payments?

What is the monetary purpose of selling fewer of these bonds, and of selling the balance to the Treasury? How much will this save the Treasury in its very costly  programme of paying for the losses? Let us have some clarity.

 

The Cabinet Secretary promises to tackle civil service productivity

I was pleased to read that the Cabinet Secretary recognises the poor productivity of the civil service, and sees she needs to rebuild the trust of many more taxpayers in the system they have to fund.When I wrote my Productivity Toolkit using the latest ONS figures up to 2025 the UK had experienced 25 years of public sector productivity not growing at all despite massive spending on computers and internet technology and the delivery of many more services on line instead of in person. The first decade of this century saw no gains. The second up to 2019 showed some improvements, which were all lost by the covid lockdowns. The recovery has been only partial leaving us with no growth in productivity for a quarter of  century.

 

The civil service when tackled about this by Conservative and now Labour Ministers have proposed spending substantial sums on AI investment, with  promised delayed improvement in productivity towards the end of the current Parliament as a result. This approach which has been adopted by this government leaves public sector costs far too high and escalating, and misses the main point. Why didn’t we capture the benefit of past extensive computerisation? Why did productivity fall off a cliff over covid without recovering fully when lockdowns ended? The AI budget was announced as £3.25 billion over three years with much of the spend this year. There has been no announced plan to ensure this results in savings and improvements, which will require plans to slim the civil service as the money is spent and as technology doe more of the work.

 

Ministers should engage with the Cabinet Secretary over how the civil service can urgently get back to 2019 levels of productivity, which was a pre AI era. They need to find out why past computerisation did not lead to smaller headcounts. I have never recommended compulsory redundancies. I have always proposed – or implement when a Minister – restrictions on new recruitment. Each time a person retires or leaves the Department should see how to amalgamate or abolish posts to avoid the need for new external recruitment. Where the post is essential another post can  be removed with a  reshuffle of staff.

 

We are promised big changes. Who will be the responsible Minister? Will the Prime Minister give it his time and set out a way through? I doubt this. The AI programme needs rescuing to ensure we get better quality at a lower price. So far extra AI spending just helps put the costs up without solving the productivity puzzle.

 

Productivity toolkit is available as a free download on the Centre for Policy Studies website.